As Lloyd reminds us, Geach's position on tense is bound up with the two-sense thesis of the predicate ' exists'. Briefly, this is the view that the predicate has two absolutely different senses-one in which it is predicable only of individuals and is thus a first-level predicate, the other in which it is predicable only of kinds and is thus a second-level predicate. I shall henceforth write these as' existsi' and' existS2* respectively. The first, which Geach calls the present actuality sense, is tensed. The second, which he calls the there-is sense, is tenseless.
Geach's alleged failure to treat tense as 'intrinsic to the very being' of temporal reality is thought to be evident from his expressing the difference between past, present, and future individuals in terms of something so extrinsic as the mere applicability of predicates. Thus, in Lloyd's view, Geach has to maintain that beginning to exist involves 'the acquisition of a predicate, something true of a thing during but not before its present actuality'.
Her suggestion has two flaws. One is in taking the acquisition of a predicate to be no different from that predicate's being true of a thing during, but not before its present actuality. The second is in thinking Discussion that the two-sense thesis conceives beginning to exist in terms of the acquisition of a predicate, viz. ' existsi'. To take the first point. To say that a predicate ' is F' is true of Socrates during but not before his present actuality is ambiguous between (a) 'Socrates is F' is true during Socrates' present actuality, but false before it, and (b) 'Socrates is F' is true during Socrates' present actuality, but neither true nor false before it.
There is no such ambiguity in the notion of Socrates' acquiring the predicate ' is F', since that could obtain only if (a), but not (b) were to hold. Precisely because it does exclude (b), the acquiring of predicates cannot be conceived in terms of something being 'true of a thing during but not before its present actuality'.
To take the second point. According to the two-sense thesis, Socrates' beginning to exist could not be conceived in terms, such as (a), which require 'Socrates existsi' to be false prior to Socrates' existing. For, since ' exists i can be said only of individuals, and since no such individual as Socrates would at that time either be or even be conceivable, 2 'Socrates existsi' would then be not even a well-formed expression. Consequently it could have no truth-value whatever, not even the value false. So, despite suggestions to the contrary, the two-sense thesis is quite incompatible with (a)-with conceiving beginning to exist as the acquiring of ' • existsi'. It is, however, quite compatible with (b).
Geach's view, therefore, positively precludes beginning to exist being conceived as the acquiring of ' existsi', even while allowing that it can and is to be conceived as ' exists i' being predicable truly during, but not before the present actuality of a thing. The difference between present and future individuals has nothing to do with the acquiring of predicates, therefore, but is simply that present individuals are individuals, whereas future ones are not individuals at all, except in an equivocal sense of that term. They are no more individual than toy cars are cars, or counterfeit dollars are dollars. Which is simply to say that the term 'future' in 'future individuals' is what the medievals called an alienans adjective.
1 Discussion said to be this. Beginning to exist is 'the coming to be of a subject for predication'. Consequently, if it were to be symmetrical with ceasing to exist, the latter should consist in the annihilation of a subject for predication. On the contrary, however, 'when a thing ceases to exist it remains a subject for predication'. In that respect, therefore, beginning and ceasing to exist are not symmetrical; and it is just that asymmetry which the use of' existsi' in ' begins to exist' and ' ceases to exist' is said to destroy. Why? Because ' existsi' seems to put 'the period before a thing comes to exist on an equal footing with the period after it has ceased to exist ' (p. 219) .
Here again the two-sense thesis is being misconstrued. Far from destroying any difference between the periods before and after a thing exists, it heavily underscores that difference. For, as we have just seen, it prohibits ' existsi' from being predicated even falsely of Socrates before he exists, but requires it to be predicable of him (though falsely) even after he has ceased to exist. In other words, it precludes ' existsi' from being used in 'Socrates will exist', while demanding its use in 'Socrates did exist'. Only ' exists2' can be used in 'Socrates will exist', only ' exists^ in 'Socrates did exist'. This is remarkably unlike putting the periods before and after existence on an equal footing.
That is borne out too by the account which the two-sense thesis is bound to give of beginning and ceasing to exist. In any particular occurrence of'begins to exist' or 'ceases to exist', the question of whether '-•-existsi' is to be used clearly depends on whether there is or has been any individual for it to be predicated of. In 'Socrates begins to exist', and in all past tenses, ' exists^ is to be used, since there would be such an individual (viz. Socrates). In the case of 'Socrates will begin to exist', however, there would be no Socrates for it to be predicated of. Here, therefore, the use of' exists 1' would be impossible, though not that of the second-level predicate ' existS2'. Although with 'ceases to exist' the same considerations regarding 'Socrates' are pertinent, the results are predictably different. There being few uses of 'ceases to exist' in which there would have been no Socrates, there would be few occasions for using anything but' exists 1'. One would be in 'Socrates will soon come into being and shortly afterwards cease to exist'. Here the second-level ' existS2' would be demanded. But, as is evident, in all this the two-sense thesis both preserves and marks the previously noted asymmetry between beginning and ceasing to exist.
II
As to whether it is true that Prior ignores this asymmetry I would make two comments. The first is that, even if his position is as it is claimed to be Discussion (and that is not altogether clear), it would still allow at least some degree of asymmetry between past and future individuals. For a future Socrates could not be a subject of predication at all, whether true or false. The past Socrates, by contrast, could be a subject of predication, though only of false predication-while much could now be false of him, nothing could now be true of him.
But, although allowing some asymmetry, the preceding position is implausible in a way to which Prior himself alludes, since it would preclude its being a fact about Socrates that he lived earlier than I, or that he is revered by many people in the twentieth century. And that leads to my second comment, namely, that even if Prior does deny that these are facts about Socrates, it is not essential that he do so, for a simple remedy is available that would leave his basic positions quite intact.
Although it is true that ' -lived earlier than Barry Miller' and ' is revered by many people in the twentieth century' are predicates that Socrates might be said to have 'acquired' since death, that should be unacceptable only if it were to betoken real change in a Socrates now incapable of it, because no longer existing. The only change so betokened, however, is not a real one, but simply a Cambridge one.
3 And, consequently, there is no reason for a blanket ban on Socrates acquiring predicates after death. He cannot of course acquire predicates that would bespeak real change in him. But he can quite legitimately acquire any predicate that would bespeak only a Cambridge change. And that would license our treating his being revered in the twentieth century as a fact about Socrates.
With this slight amendment to Prior's putative position, the asymmetry between future and past individuals would be decidedly more marked than his unamended position would allow. On the unamended view, a future individual could not be a subject of any predication, whereas a past individual could be a subject of (false) predication. On the amended view, however, a past individual could be a subject of both true and false predication, though only of those true predications that carried no implication of real change in Socrates. This would seem enough to declare Prior innocent of any challenge to the asymmetry between past and future individuals.
I l l
Lloyd has depicted the two-sense thesis and Prior as offering contrary views on temporality-past, present and future being distinguished qua 3 The distinction between real change and mere Cambridge change is due to Geach. A mere Cambridge change is the kind 'undergone' by butter whenever its price rises or falls. Its melting would be a real change. 256 1 r Discussion bjects by the latter, and by the former not qua subjects, but only as regards the applicability of predicates to those subjects. It is now clear, however, that the contrast is misconceived, since it falsely assumes that the two-sense thesis draws the distinction purely in terms of the applicability of predicates. Indeed, no less than Prior, that thesis can distinguish past, present, and future individuals 'in their very status as subjects'. So, it does not compete with Prior, nor Prior with it.
In fact, the two accounts cover largely different areas: where the one says much, the other says little. Prior barely touches upon a first-level use of' exists', though what little he does say is agreeable to that use.
4
Among his principal concerns, however, are the logical role of tense inflectors and the status of past, present and future individuals.
The two-sense thesis on the other hand says little explicitly about either tenses or the status of past, present and future individuals, although underlying it is the absolute distinction between individuals and kinds, and between names and predicates, distinctions to which Prior's views on individuals are, to say the least, very congenial. Explicitly, however, it is concerned mainly with the role of' exists' as a first-level predicate, and with defending that predicate against the charge of vacuity. It is also concerned to note that, in propositions involving ' existsi', the expressions 'not', 'no longer', 'begins to', and 'ceases to' modify not predicates, butpropositions 5 -which interestingly is the kind of role that Prior allots also to tense inflectors.
There is no difficulty and much merit therefore in combining the two accounts, by having the two-sense thesis adopt Prior's views both on tensing and on individuals. More importantly, the composite account readily satisfies Lloyd's two criteria for an adequate account of temporality.
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4 G. E. Moore took issue with Russell by noting that 'This exists' could not be meaningless (as Russell claimed), since 'This might not have existed' is not only meaningful, but generally true. Prior mentions this both in The Doctrine of and in Past, . In the latter he endorses Moore's view by remarking that 'there is a sense of "This might not have existed" in which what it says could be the case (and generally is) i.e. the sense: "It is not the case that (it is necessary that (x exists))" NLE\x\ 5 In taking these expressions to modify' exists' rather than the propositions containing that predicate, Lloyd consistently misconstrues the two-sense thesis. The same misunderstanding underlies Dummett's point which she quotes with approval on p. 217. Cf. my 'In Defence of the Predicate "Exists" ', Mind 84, No. 335 (July 1975), 338-354--• 18 2 5 7
